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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
Is A BILL WHICH AT THE SAME TIME SEEKS REFORMATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF A CONTRACT OBJECTIONABLE UPON THE GROUND

OF MULTIFARIOUSNESS.-The recent case of Fidelity Realty Com-

pany v. Fidelity Corporation of New Jersey et al. 1 was based
upon the following circumstances: The complainant had conveyed certain property to the Goetz-Kassab Company and taken
back a purchase money mortgage for $42,500, which was subordinate to a previously existing first mortgage of $25,000. Subsequently the Goetz-Kassab Company entered an agreement to sell
the property to the defendant. By the agreement the defendant
assumed the first mortgage of $25,000 and the $42,500 mortgage
held by plaintiffs and also gave still a third mortgage for the
balance. The language of the deed did not follow that of the
agreement as to assumption of the first and second mortgages by
defendant. The language of the deed was "subject to the payment of the principal and interest" as to both of these mortgages.
This discrepancy was not noticed by the attorneys for either of
the parties.
Later the complainant foreclosed the $42,500 mortgage given it
by Goetz-Kassab Company in which proceedings the defendants
were made parties. The result of the foreclosure was that com1 166 Atl. 727.
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plainants bought the property at the sheriff's sale for $100, subject to the first mortgage. The complainant then sought a decree
against defendant for the deficiency upon the bond accompanying the foreclosed mortgage, claiming that defendant had
assumed the mortgage and thus become the primary debtor. The
complainant also asked a reformation of the deed to embody in
it the language of the agreement, if such reformation were necessary to enforce the decree. Upon final hearing the defendant
interposed an objection that the bill was multifarious. Judgment
was given for complainant.
The chancellor disposed of the objection to the bill as multithe objection was not
farious on two distinct grounds -that
timely and that no reformation was required to entitle the complainant to a decree. Under the circumstances it was not necessary to decide this point, but in commenting upon this question
the chancellor indicated that if required to decide it, he would
Chancellor Backes in the case of Segal
follow the opinion of Vice
2
v. Lesire Corporation.
In this case the complainant had entered into a written contract with the Wyoming Heights, Inc., for the purchase of a
certain lot. A search disclosed that record title to the lot was in
the Lesire Corporation. In the bill plaintiff declared that the
officers and directors of the two companies were identical and
prayed for reformation of the contract of sale by the substitution
of the name of the Lesire Corporation for that of Wyoming
Heights, Inc., and for specific performance of the contract as
so reformed. The chancellor dismissed the bill upon defendant's
motion, on the ground that in such a case to grant reformation
by the substitution of the name of the owner corporation for that
of the grantor corporation would "be virtually to repeal the
Statute of Frauds." However, the chancellor expressly set out
in a syllabus written by the court that "If a contract is reformable and enforceable as reformed, it may be reformed and
enforced in the same suit." The chancellor supports this statement by showing that the statement made in the earlier case of
Gross et al. v. Yeskel et al.3 that "Equity will not in one proceeding concede dual relief of reformation of an agreement and specific performance thereof when reformed," was properly limited
to cases where such reformation would vitiate the requirements
of the statute of frauds.
While in these cases the pleading question of multifariousness
is not squarely met, yet the broad lines upon which this question
may be approached, are clearly indicated. On the one hand is the
113 N. J. Eq. 198, 166 At. 75.
3 100 N. J. Eq. 293, 134 At. 737.
2
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procedural and pleading question and on the other the question
of equity jurisprudence involving the reformation of written
instruments.
In a consideration of the question of multifariousness of a bill
in equity one is immediately confronted with the elementary fact
that there is no settled or inflexible rule as to what constitutes
this defect. Each case must be considered with regard to the
particular circumstances there presented, and the determination
is largely a matter of the discretion and convenience of the
court. 4 There are, however, certain principles and tests which
may be applied to the circumstances of a particular case and
which may be summed up as "improperly joining in one bill
distinct and independent matters, and thereby confounding
them; as, for example, the uniting, in one bill, of several matters,
perfectly distinct and unconnected, against one defendant, or the
demand of several matters of a distinct and independent nature
against several defendants in the same bill."5
This description points out the two major divisions of the subject: first, multifariousness as to parties, and, second, multifariousness as to matters or causes. The first of these involves the
improper joining of parties plaintiff or parties defendant who
have separate and distinct interests in the subject matter of the
suit. It is obvious that this division has little bearing upon the
question here involved; therefore further consideration will be
limited to the question of multifariousness as to matters, or
causes.
Although the term "multifariousness" is usually applied to
equitable proceedings, and the term "misjoinder" is usually
applied to common law actions, yet "misjoinder" is also given
a place in the nomenclature of chancery practice as indicative of
improper joining of causes of action as distinguished from improper joining of parties, and thus it is considered as a species
of multifariousness. It follows that in the consideration of the
present question the word "multifariousness" is used as synonymous with the more specific word "misjoinder" when used in its
chancery sense.
The question of multifariousness as to matters or causes set
up in a bill may further be classified with respect to bills which
seek relief in the same suit on a plurality of matters and those
which seek to establish the right to a plurality of forms of relief,
4 Baird v. Jackson, 98 111. 78; Densmore v. Savage, 110 Mich. 27, 67 N. W.
1103; Robinson v. Guild, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 323; Carroll v. Roosevelt, 4 Edw.

Ch. (N. Y.) 211.
5 Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, (9th ed.), sec. 271.
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upon the same subject matter. It is also obvious that both of
these classes may be further complicated by involving a plurality
of parties either as plaintiffs or defendants who may have varying rights or liabilities as to some part or all of the subject
matter.
In the leading case of Campbell v. Mackay,6 although the relief
sought involved a plurality of matters in that the defendants
were trustees under distinct trusts, the defendants' demurrer for
multifariousness was overruled. Lord Cottenham, in an exhaustive review of the entire question of multifariousness, clearly
pointed out that the purpose of the objection of multifariousness
is to protect the defendant from being put to unnecessary or
oppressive expense in the litigation of matters in which he has no
interest or liability. Referring to the defendant's contention of
a general rule that distinct matters should never be united in
the same record he pointed out that if this rule were carried to
its full extent, it would be extremely mischievous in that it would
lead to a multiplication of suits and would secure no possible
advantage. This decision is founded on the principle that the
question of multifariousness depends on the circumstances of the
particular case and is a matter within the discretion of the court.
If the various matters sought to be litigated together are so
related that to allow such determination is not oppressive to
defendants and will tend to avoid multiplicity of suits, the bill
will not be held to be multifarious.
Another aspect of this phase of the question is covered by the
case of Boyd v. Moyle7 wherein it was held that a bill was not
multifarious which sought to restrain two separate actions, one
against the plaintiffs for trover, and the other against plaintiffs'
messenger for trespass in connection with the same goods.
With respect to cases where the bill sets forth several grounds
for relief with respect to a single subject, the question of multifariousness impinges upon the doctrine of equity's favoring the
prevention of multiplicity of suits. In general, the requirement
is that the different kinds of relief prayed for must be consistent
with each other and with the allegations of the bill. Some courts
adopt the position that in cases of this nature there is presented
but a single cause of action.8
The object of a bill for reformation is the establishment or
protection of primary rights. Reformation alone does not afford
ultimate relief but is a preliminary step to the obtaining of such
6 1 Myl. & Cr. 603, 40 Eng. Rep. 507.
7 2 Coll. 316, 63 Eng. Rep. 750.
8 Hutchinson v. Ainsworth, 73 Cal. 452; McClurg v. Phillips, 49 Mo. 315;
Meyer v. VanCollem, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 222.
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relief either in the same action or in a subsequent suit. It operates "to declare the status which the parties intended to create,
and upon which such rights as they would have acquired under
a correct instrument may be asserted and defended. "9 The question of reformation is, therefore, not a matter of construction of
the instrument to determine the meaning or operation of the
existing instrument, but rather a determination of the real intention of the parties as to the substance of the instrument as of the
time of the original execution. The purpose of reformation is not
to make a new agreement for the parties but rather to give to the
existing agreement the effect originally intended. It is, therefore,
essential to this relief that there be a valid existing agreement,'0
which, because of mistake, has taken a form not intended.
It is obvious, however, that equitable reformation based on
mistake must in many instances impinge upon the operation of
the statute of frauds. There is no doubt but that the statute of
frauds affects actions in equity as well as at law, and the fundamental basis for granting reformation which apparently violates
it is that the statute of frauds will not be so applied as to enable
a fraud to be committed. The limitations of the right to reformation with respect to the operation of statute of frauds may best
be considered by classifying the cases into (1) executed contracts
and those involving part performance, and (2) executory contracts. Each of these is again subdivided into those cases where
reformation involves a diminution of the subject matter and
those where the reformation involves an enlargement of the
subject matter.
In the case of executed and partially executed contracts, the
existence of performance and part performance is held to take
the case out of the statute of frauds, and the weight of authority
holds that this applies regardless of whether the reformation
sought, results in a diminution or an enlargement. On the other
hand, Massachusetts and a few other jurisdictions limit such
relief to those cases involving only diminution. The leading case
supporting this view is Glass v. Hulbert," in which the argument is made that when the relief sought is the enlargement of
the terms of the writing then the relief cannot be granted, since
the agreement sought to be established is within the statute of
frauds, and the writing does not include the terms of the agreement contended for. But it is said that when it is only sought
to diminish the terms, then the diminished contract is included in
the terms of the larger written contract and hence is evidenced
by a written memorandum.
9 Parker v. Parker et ux., 88 Ala. 362, 6 So. 740.
10 Hunt v. The Administrators of Rousmaniere, 7 L. Ed. 27; Price v. Cutts, 29
Ga. 142, 74 Am. Dec. 52.
It 102 Mass. 24.
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With respect to executory contracts, there are many cases
which allow reformation without regard to whether the result is
enlargement or diminution, upon the theory that when the
parties intended to comply with the statute and failed through
mistake or fraud, the statute of frauds does not interfere with
the power of courts of equity to grant reformation. 12 This reasoning is extended even to granting specific performance of the
contract as reformed. 13 Obviously, if this theory were carried to
its logical conclusion it would practically abolish the statute of
frauds. Needless to say, those jurisdictions which follow the doctrine of Glass v. Hulbert would limit the reformation to cases
involving diminution and thus, as applied to specific performance, would make it a matter of defense.
On the other hand, there are many well reasoned cases in which
relief is denied in the case of executory contracts, particularly
where it is sought to enlarge the subject matter, unless there
has been part performance or circumstances which would make
the denial of reformation work a fraud on complainant. 14 The
theory of these cases limits reformation in purely executory contracts to defensive relief on the grounds that the complainants
have an adequate remedy in rescission and that equity will not
interfere to secure for complainant the benefit of a bargain where
to do so involves abrogation of the statute of frauds.
A close study of the cases would indicate that this latter view
is probably based on the sounder reasoning. Many of the cases
cited in favor of the former rule are found to have been based
on executed contracts or those in which there was part perform16
ance, 1 5 while in others the decision is based upon local statutes.
The right to reformation for mistake is limited to the original
parties to the instrument or those in privity with them. In the
case of voluntary instruments not based on consideration, reformation will not be given against the grantor in favor of the
grantee because of the absence of an equitable obligation which
is binding on the grantor. 1'7 However, the grantor in a voluntary
conveyance would, of course, be entitled to reformation, as 8for
example, if a larger estate was conveyed than was intended.'
In cases where the rights of strangers are involved, equity is
12

Blackburn v. Randolph, 33 Ark. 119.

13 Froyd v. Schultz, 260 Ill. 268, 103 N. E. 220.
14 Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052; Woollam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. 211,

32 Eng. Rep. 86; Wirtz v. Guthrie, 81 N. J. Eq. 271, 87 AtI. 134; Osborn v.
Phelps, 19 Conn. 63.
15 Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 585; Hendrickson v. Ivins, 1 N. J.
Eq. 562; Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 144.
16 Kee v. Davis, 137 Cal. 456, 70 P. 294; Hitchins v. Pettingill, 58 N. H. 386.
17 Dickinson v. Glenney, 27 Conn. 103.
18 Andrews v. Andrews, 12 Ind. 348; Wyche and Wife v. Greene, 16 Ga. 49.
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averse to permitting reformation,19 and will not permit the
injury of innocent third parties, such as lien holders or bona
fide purchasers who cannot be placed in statu quo. However, the
rights of third parties are subject to the same equitable rules in
suits involving reformation as in any other action in equity and
will be protected only to the extent that they have accrued without notice.20 When proper provision has been made to protect
such rights, the instrument may still be reformed as to its effect
21
on the rights of the principal parties.
Other fundamental principles of equity jurisprudence which
affect most intimately the principal question are that equity will
take jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of suits, and that having
once taken jurisdiction will retain it to afford complete relief.
These principles of equity jurisdiction, on the one hand, and of
pleading with respect to multifariousness, on the other, while
obviously closely related and apparently antagonistic, are not the
same subject.2 2 Multifariousness is a defensive pleading the object
of which is to prevent injustice or hardship to the party making
the plea. The jurisdictional principle of preventing multiplicity
of suits is intended to facilitate the settlement of controversies in
an economical and expeditious manner, and when properly
applied is undoubtedly for the benefit of both plaintiff and
defendant. The question of the joining of causes of action to
avoid multiplicity of suits, just as is the case regarding multifariousness, is not subject to determination by any hard and fast
rule but is determined according to the circumstances of the
particular case at the discretion of the court.
It follows that in a suit for reformation other relief may be
secured so long as it is not inconsistent and is not objectionable
for multifariousness, particularly with respect to misjoinder of
parties. Thus reformation and other consistent equitable relief
are clearly permissible, and the additional relief may even be
that which, if sought separately, would properly be an action at
law. Thus, there is ample authority that an instrument may be
reformed and enforced as reformed, 23 that a mortgage may be
reformed and foreclosed. 24 Similarly with respect to added relief
at law, a contract may be reformed and money recovered which
was previously paid, 25 and a deed may be reformed and money
Anderson v. Tydings, 8 Md. 427, 63 Am. Dec. 708.
Nolen v. Henry, 190 Ala. 540, 67 So. 500.
21 Yarnell v. Brown, 170 I1. 362, 48 N. E. 909.
22 Roanoke Guano Co. v. Saunders, 56 So. 198.
23 Froyd v. Schultz, 260 111. 268, 103 N. E. 200; Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4
Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 144.
24 Hutchinson v. Ainsworth, 73 Cal. 452, 15 P. 82.
25 Nelson v. Vassenden, 115 Minn. 1, 131 N. W. 794.
'9

20
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damages awarded on covenants of the deed as reformed. 26 In
view of the foregoing it is obvious that the principal case of
Fidelity Realty Co. v. Fidelity Corporation of New Jersey was
correctly decided.
. MAY AN ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR MAKE A VALID DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS nT His HANDS ?-One of America's fabulous for-

tunes, the Jay Gould estate, which provided litigation in the
New York courts for many years, again is the subject of litigation. In re Beresford's Estate' was a proceeding for an accounting by the ancillary administrator of the estate of Vivien Helen
De La Poer Beresford (Lady Decies), a granddaughter of Jay
Gould, and at the time of her death a resident of England. The
special guardian of her minor children objected, among other
things, to the proposed transmissal to the domiciliary administrator in England of certain annual payments received by decedent
and to be received by her estate. The court overruled the objection and held that the fact that such distribution would result in
heavy English death duties on the shares of beneficiaries there
would not alone justify local distribution.
Under sections 164 and 165 of the New York Surrogate's Court
Act, it is the duty of an ancillary representative to transmit the
assets of an estate to the domiciliary forum, unless otherwise
directed by the decree of the court issuing the letters, which may
in its discretion, after payment in full or pro rata of New York
creditors, decree distribution to persons interested in the estate
without transmission. 2 O'Brien, S., who decided this case, quoted
with approval from Matter of Worch's Estate3 what may be
regarded as settled New York law :'
"In ancillary administration the recognition of the rights of
foreign creditors and beneficiaries of the estate, and the distribuButler v. Barnes, 60 Conn. 170, 21 At. 419, 12 L. R. A. 273.
1262 N. Y. S. 78.
2 Laws of 1920, Chapter 928, as amended. Gilbert-Bliss Civil Practice of the
State of New York, XIII, 133 f. Section 165 reads as follows: "The surrogate's
court, or any court of the state, which has jurisdiction of an action to procure an
accounting, or a judgment construing the will, may in a proper case, by its judgment or decree, direct a person, to whom ancillary letters are issued as prescribed in this article, to pay, out of the money or the avails of the property,
received by him under the ancillary letters, and with which he is chargeable
upon his accounting, the debts of the decedent, due to creditors residing within
the state; or, if the amount of all the decedent's debts here and elsewhere
exceeds the amount of all the decedent's personal property applicable thereto, to
pay such a sum to each creditor, residing within the state as equals that creditor's share of all the distributable assets, or to distribute the same among the
legatees or next of kin, or otherwise dispose of the same, as justice requires."
3 208 N. Y. S.652.
4 But see In re James, 144 N. Y. 6, wherein the executor of a will probated in
New York elected to pay legacies out of property in Great Britain rather than
out of New York property, the purpose being to enable residuary legatees to
escape the New York inheritance tax, and was permitted to do so.
26
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tion by decree of the local court are essentially in the discretion
of the surrogate under the statutes and authorities of our state.
We may, in special cases, direct a distribution of the New York
property in the hands of our administrators among non-resident
claimants. The general course of procedure, however, has been
to remit the surplus funds, after the payment of our creditors, to
the domiciliary executor, administrator, or other representative.
The transmissal of the assets to the state or country of residence
is a matter of judicial discretion, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. 5 .

.

. This discretion to distribute

in the ancillary administration will be exercised only where it
tends to promote justice or convenience; or where all the interested parties are before the court; or where there are no debts;
or where local distribution will avoid the expense of double
administration, or in general to avoid unnecessary circuity. ' '
In the principal case, the court stated that the bulk of decedent's estate was in England; the beneficiaries resided in England and were desirous of having the estate administered and
distributed there. It did not appear that justice or convenience
would be promoted by local distribution, or that double expense
would be avoided, or that decedent had no debts in England.
The only ground advanced for New York distribution, the avoidance of the English inheritance tax, the court considered insufficient to prevent transmissal to England.
Ancillary administration has had as its raison d'etre the incapacity of executors and administrators to act officially outside
7
their appointing jurisdiction without local statutory authority.
An ancillary, or auxiliary, administrator was originally considered as "only the deputy or agent of the executor abroad" 8 and
his power was limited to collecting assets within his jurisdiction
and, after converting them into cash and paying the expenses of
ancillary administration, transmitting the entire fund to the
5 Citing Helme v. Buckelew,* 229 N. Y. 363, 128 N. E. 216; Hopper v.
Hopper,* 125 N. Y. 400, 26 N. E. 457; Matter of Hughes, 95 N. Y. 55; Despard
v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 199; Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103; Bostwick v. Carr,*
151 N. Y. S. 74; Matter of Bliss, 202 N. Y. S. 185; Moyer v. Weil, 1 Dem. 71.
*Not directly in point.
6 Citing 36 Harv. L. Rev. 608 (note).

7 Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214, 20 S. Ct. 603.
"It is exceedingly clear that the probate grant of letters testamentary or of
letters of administration in one country give authority to collect the assets of the
testator or intestate only in that country and do not extend to the collection
of assets in foreign countries; for that would be to assume an extra territorial
jurisdiction or authority and to usurp the functions of the foreign local tribunals
in those matters." Joseph Story, Conflict of Laws, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
8th ed., 1883), p. 710, sec. 507 et seq.
8 Dawes v. Head, 20 Mass. 128, 142.
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principal or domiciliary administrator, leaving creditors to seek
relief in the latter forum. However, a consciousness of the right
of local creditors to a settlement in the ancillary jurisdiction led
courts at an early date to subject ancillary assets within the
jurisdiction to local demands before ordering transmission to the
domicile. Goodall v. Marshall,9 decided in 1840, presents the
doctrine of international law that distribution of "moveables" is
governed by the law of the place where the owner has his domicile. Although the ancient rule of "mobilia sequuntur personam,"
has been so restricted by judicial decision in sales of chattels,
whether absolute' 0 or conditional," in chattel mortgages' 2 and
in similar cases involving title, possession or ownership of personalty as to be without practical significance,' 3 distribution of
personalty14 continues to be made in accordance with the lex
domicilii.

Every state has supreme power over the persons and property
of citizens within its borders, subject, of course, to well-defined
constitutional limitations. If, then, a state should choose to
retain foreign assets within its jurisdiction and decree distribution according to its own laws, one could not well question its
power to do so within its own borders. 15 But the well-recognized
principle of comity, and, in some states, statutory provisions,
temper this dispositive power. 16 Despite the undoubted power
of the state, courts regarded the universal rule of distribution
as mandatory and not discretionary.
The case generally recognized as announcing the doctrine of
discretion as applied to ancillary administration is Harvey v.
Richards,17 an admirable decision of Justice Story. In this case
9 11 N. H. 88, 35 Am. Dec. 472.
10 Cammell v. Sewell, (Exch. Chamber, 1860), 5 Hurl. & N. 728.
11 Hervey v. Rhode Island Loco. Works, 93 U. S. 664, 23 L. Ed. 1003.
12 Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 P. 155; Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y.
199; Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U. S. 139, 19 L. Ed. 109.
13 A. V. Dicey, Conflict of Laws, (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., Sweet &
Maxwell, Ltd., 5th ed., 1932), pp. 337-40.
14 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Vogel's Ex'trix, 76 Ala. 441, 52 Am. Rep. 344.
Authorities collected in Story, Conflict of Laws, p. 677, sec. 481, and 18 C. J. 8.
15 Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U. S. 139; Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214.
"Whoever sends personal property to this state or consents to its removal
impliedly submits to the regulations of this state concerning its transfer here.
. . . The rights of parties to transactions within the state in regard to property removed to the state with the consent of the owner may properly be
governed by the law of the state." Ross v. Ross, 253 N. Y. S. 871.
16 "It certainly is now a settled principle of international law, that personal
property shall be subject to that law which governs the person of the owner, and
that the distribution of and succession to personal property, wherever situated,
is to be governed by the laws of that country where the owner or intestate had
his domicile at the time of his death. Holcomb v. Phelps, 16 Conn. 127."
Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577, 56 Am. Dec. 385.
17 1 Mason 381, (Circ. Ct. D. Mass. 1818).
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a bill in equity was brought to compel the defendant administrator with the will annexed of James Murray, late of Calcutta,
India, to distribute the undevised estate of the testator in Massachusetts among next of kin residing in Rhode Island.' 8 The
deceased's domiciliary executors had appointed the defendant to
obtain letters of administration in Massachusetts and collect the
testator's effects there. 19 It did not appear that any part of the
assets in Massachusetts was required for the payment of any
debts at the domicile or legacies under the will. The respondent
denied the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court of
chancery to decree ancillary distribution.
Judge Story granted the relief prayed for, and indicated that
the power of a court of equity to assert jurisdiction in the premises was undisputed, provided the distribution be made according to the law of the place of the testator's domicil, saying
further:
"The property is here, the parties are here, and the rule of
distribution is fixed. What reason then exists, why the court
should not proceed to decree according to the rights of the
parties? Why should it send our own citizens to a foreign tribunal to seek that justice, which it is in its own power to administer
without injustice to any other person?
"Whether the court here ought to decree distribution or
remit the property abroad, is a matter, not of jurisdiction, but
of judicial discretion, depending upon the particular circumstances of each case. . . . There ought to be no universal rule
on the subject; but . . . every nation is bound to lend the
aid of its own tribunals for the purpose of enforcing the rights
of all persons having title to the fund, when such interference
will not be productive of injustice or inconvenience, or conflicting
equities. . . . I have no objection to the use of the terms
principal and auxiliary as indicating a distinction in fact as to
the objects of the different administrations, but . . . each of
these administrations may be properly considered as a principal
one, with reference to the limits of its exclusive authority."
In announcing his decision, Judge Story realized that this case
was not the first determination of the question in this country,
and that Massachusetts had ruled otherwise in Selectmen of
Boston v. Boylstoi. 2 0 But this and similar decisions occurred in
probate proceedings before courts of special jurisdiction, and
18 See Olney v. Angell, 5 R. I. 198, 73 Am. Dec. 62, where a similar bill by
legatees was allowed.
19 The regularity of this appointment was not questioned.
20 2 Mass. 384. Pennsylvania had already granted ancillary distribution. See
Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349, note; and see also Desesbats v. Berquier, 1 Binn.
336. In England in Bowaman v. Reeve, Prec. Ch. 577, a suit by legatees against
the ancillary administrator for their legacies, relief was granted.
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did not consider a suit in equity of the nature here involved.
The importance of Harvey v. Richards lies, not in the recognition of the equitable power of decreeing local distribution, but
in the independent assertion of the element of judicial discretion
as governing the exercise of such distributive power.
By statute or judicial decision in almost every American jurisdiction, the rule has since been adopted throughout this country, 21 even to the extent of vesting the exercise of discretion in

the probate court itself. New York has such a statute, as the
principal case indicates, but the rule was22 recognized prior to
statutory enactment in Parsons v. Lyman.
Certain specific instances of circumstances which the court
considered sufficient, in its discretion, to justify ancillary distribution will best illustrate the scope and application of the
principle throughout this country. The argument that resident
legatees are entitled to protection as well as creditors influenced
the court in Campbell's Estate.23 In Lathrop's Estate24 local
distribution was ordered when distribution at the domicile was
shown to be against public policy there. All the parties inter2
ested in the assets were before the court in Cassily v. Meyer, 5
and no necessity for transferring the assets to the domicile in
Ohio were presented; so, as such transmissal would incur further
delay and expense, local distribution was ordered.
Where a fund belonging to the estate of a foreign intestate
was realized under ancillary administration in New York, and
it appeared that the claimant was entitled to receive the entire
fund, and that all other claimants had received their shares at
the domicile, the fund was ordered paid over to such claimant
21 Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577; In re Lawrence's Will, 39 Vt. 424,
108 A. 387; Bertin's Estate, 245 Pa. 256, 91 A. 669; Gaines' Succession, 46 La.
Ann. 252, 14 So. 602; In re Lathrop's Estate, 165 Cal. 243, 131 P. 752; Bedell
v. Clark, 171 Mich. 486, 137 N. W. 627; Watkins v. Eaton, 183 Fed. 384; In re
Adlum's Estate, 22 Pa. St. 514; J. G. Woerner, A Treatise on the American Law
of Administration, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 3rd. ed., 1923), I, 578, sec.
167. H. Clay Horner, Probate Practice, (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 2nd ed.,
1896), p. 541, sec. 410; 24 C. J. 2701.
22 20 N. Y. 103. The testator died a resident of Connecticut, which was also
the domicile of the legatees. Five-sixths of the estate was before the Connecticut
probate court. The New York executor desired to remit the remainder to that
jurisdiction for distribution. Several legatees who moved to New York after
testator's death insisted upon New York distribution. The surrogate differed in
opinion from the Connecticut court in construing the will and ordered ancillary
distribution. On appeal, the order was reversed, and remission to Connecticut
decreed, the facts being held insufficient to invoke the court's discretion to order
local distribution.
23 53 Utah 487, 173 P. 688.
24 165 Cal. 243.
25 4 Md. 1.
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directly. 26 The court in In re Lane's Estate27 decreed ancillar
distribution upon petition by all the heirs and proof that there
were no domiciliary creditors.
Where the will of a resident of Vermont, who died in New
York, was probated in New York, nine-tenths of the value of his
estate being in the latter state, and none of the legatees resided
in Vermont, and there was undistributed realty in Vermont
greatly in excess of the amount claimed by that state for inheritance taxes, the net assets in New York were distributed
there.2 8 In Graveley v. Graveley29 the domiciliary estate was already settled, while in Welch v. Adams,30 there were ample assets
for legacies as well as debts, and so the ancillary administrator
was empowered, in his discretion, to make distribution. All in31
terested parties were before the court in Succession of Gaines.
In Illinois no statute provides for ancillary administration,
except inferentially under section 10 of the Wills Act 32 and sections 43 and 44 of the Administration Act. 23 The general propo26
27
23
29

Suarez v. City of New York, 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 173.
199 Iowa 520, 202 N. W. 244.
Froyd v. Schultz, 260 Ill. 268, 103 N. E. 220; Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4
25 S. C. 1, 60 Am. Rep. 478.
30 152 Mass. 74, 25 N. E. 34.
31 46 La. Ann. 252, 14 So. 602.
32 "For the purpose of granting administration of both testate and intestate
estates, the situs of specialty debts shall be where the instrument happens to be,
and of simple contract debts and other choses in action where the debtor
resides." Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. St. 1933, Ch. 148. Interpreted and applied in
Martin v. Central Trust Company, 327 Ill. 622, 159 N. E. 312.
33 "When any person has proved or may prove the last will and testament of
any deceased person, and taken on him the execution of said will, or has
obtained or may obtain administration of the estate of an intestate in any state
in the United States or in any territory thereof, such person shall be enabled to
prosecute suits to enforce claims of the estate of the deceased, or to sell lands
to pay debts, in any court in this state, in the same manner as if letters testamentary or of administration had been granted to him under the provisions of
the laws of this state: Provided, that such persons shall produce a copy of the
letters testamentary or of administration, authenticated in the manner prescribed
by the laws of the Congress of the United States for authenticating the records
of judicial acts in any one state, in order to give them validity in other states;
and, provided, that said executor or administrator shall give a bond for costs,
as in case of other nonresidents.
"Nothing contained in the preceding section shall be so construed as to apply
to cases of any intestate nor where letters testamentary are granted in this
state; and when, after any suit is commenced by any administrator or executor
under the provisions of the preceding section, and before final judgment thereon,
administration is had, or execution undertaken within this state, under the laws
of the same, upon the estate of any decedent, upon suggestion of such fact,
entered of record, the said resident, administrator or executor shall, upon
motion, be substituted as party to such suit; and thereupon the court shall
proceed to bear and determine the same, as if it had been originally instituted
in the name of the said resident, executor or administrator, and the benefits of
the judgment, order or decree shall enure to him, and be assets in his hands."
Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. St. 1933, Ch. 3. This is the Uniform Executor's Act which
was upheld in Walker v. Walker, 55 Ill. App. 118.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

sition that the law of the domicile governs the disposition of
personalty at common law has been accepted by the Illinois
courts. 34 As to the application of the doctrine to property in
this state, decisions have differed. The appellate court, in
Dickson v. Fisher,35 considered itself bound to order the ancillary administrator in Illinois to transmit assets, after payment
of claims, to the domiciliary administrator in Missouri for distribution. A number of Supreme Court cases were cited in
support of the view that such procedure was mandatory. None
of the cases cited, however, conclusively rejected the view that
the court might exercise its discretion in directing ancillary distribution. The fact that no case directly affirmed the view may
be explained in that the facts in none of the cases warranted the
exercise of such discretion. And in Dickson v. Fisher the only
argument for ancillary distribution was the avoidance of costs
and commissions which would attach to the additional funds, and
the court indicated that this was insufficient for the exercise of
discretion even if such discretion was vested in the court.
In view of the modern decisions in inheritance tax cases holding that the lex rei sitae and not the lex domicilii governs, 6 it
would not be surprising if the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur
personam-a doctrine ecclesiastical in its origin 3T--were discarded altogether. The New York statute, leaving the matter of
direct distribution of assets in New York to the discretion of the
court, although making such a discard possible, appears to have
been treated as merely declaratory of the general rule, and
therefore the exercise of discretion will continue to be limited to
circumstances where it is recognized as being proper in the
absence of such a statute.
35211 Ill. App. 45 (1918).
34 Paschall v. Hailman, 9 Ill. 285; Russell v. Madden, 95 Ill. 485; Cooper v.
Beers, 143 Ill. 25.
36 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603; Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co, v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S.
586, 50 S. Ct. 436; First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52
S. Ct. 174.
37 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers, (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & Howe, 1920), "Early English Equity," p. 14 et. seq.; "Executors," p.
141 et. seq.; Woerner, A Treatise on the American Law of Administration, secs.
137-8, p. 472.

